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Abstract—The Lightning Network is the most widely used
payment channel network (PCN) to date, making it an attractive
attack surface for adversaries. In this paper, we analyze the
Lightning Network’s PCN topology and investigate its resilience
towards random failures and targeted attacks. In particular, we
introduce the notions of channel exhaustion and node isolation
attacks and show that the Lightning Network is susceptible to
these attacks. In a preliminary analysis, we confirm that the
Lightning Network can be classified as a small-world and scale-
free network. Based on these findings, we develop a series of
strategies for targeted attacks and introduce metrics that allow
us to quantify the adversary’s advantage. Our results indicate
that an attacker who is able to remove a certain number of nodes
should follow a centrality-based strategy, while a resource-limited
attacker who aims for high efficiency should employ a highest
ranked minimum cut strategy.
I. INTRODUCTION
As cryptocurrencies gain more real-world relevance, they
are currently faced with serious scalability issues [1]. Payment
channel networks (PCNs) address some of these issues by
processing transactions off-chain. To this end, nodes open so-
called payment channels, which are secured by the blockchain.
They can be used to realize direct payments between channel
endpoints as well as multi-hop payments, even though no
direct channel exists. As a consequence, PCNs facilitate high
transaction rates that are not limited by the sheer number of
processable transactions anymore, but individually by the net-
work’s maximum flow capacity for source-destination paths.
While there are different payment channel designs [2, 3, 4,
5, 6], the Bitcoin Lightning Network [7] is arguably the most
prevalent PCN implementation to date: at the time of writing,
it features a large, rapidly growing network of around 2,500
public nodes and a total capacity of more than 400BTC (≈ 1.4
million USD). At the same time, this makes the Lightning
Network an attractive attack surface for adversaries.
In this paper, we analyze the Lightning Network’s PCN
topology and provide details on random and targeted attacks.
Moreover, we introduce the notion of exhaustion attacks,
node isolation attacks, and develop a series of adversarial
strategies. Most notably, we show that the Lightning Network
is susceptible to these attacks and can indeed be disrupted.
To this end, we apply methods from the field of network
theory [8, 9, 10], to determine essential graph properties of
the Lightning Network. In particular, we evaluate whether
the Lightning Network can be considered a small world [11]
and/or scale free network [12]. While the latter is known to
tolerate random node failures very well, the first exhibits short
path lengths and high clustering coefficients when compared
to random graphs. Both characteristics support the assessment
of the Lightning Network’s PCN topology in terms of central-
ization, fault tolerance, and performance.
We use the insights from our network analysis to investigate
possible strategies for targeted attacks, which may lead to a
network split. In particular, we not only consider denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks, but also discuss how malicious Light-
ning Network nodes can exhaust payment channels, effectively
isolating entire nodes. An adversary can use this attack vector
to render whole parts of the network unreachable. We develop
a series of attack strategies and quantify the adversary’s
advantage along a number of metrics, including reachability,
payment success, and maximum flow.
Our results indicate that the Lightning Network can be
classified as a small-world as well as scale-free network
topology. Accordingly, our assumption that the network is
generally vulnerable to targeted attacks is confirmed. We
demonstrate the network’s susceptibility to targeted attacks by
conducting an empirical analysis based on a recent snapshot
of the Lightning Network. The results suggest that an attacker
who is able to remove a certain number of nodes should follow
a centrality-based strategy, while a resource-limited attacker
who aims for high efficiency should employ a highest ranked
minimum cut strategy. The main contributions of our work can
be summarized as follows:
• We study the current state of the Lightning Network’s
PCN topology and assess its resilience to random failures
and targeted attacks.
• We systematize topology-based attacks against PCNs.
• We introduce channel exhaustion and node isolation
attacks as additional attack vectors.
• We develop various adversarial strategies and quantify
their prospects in terms of the adversarial success.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Sec-
tion II is concerned with our findings regarding the network’s
basic characteristics. In Section III, we present the possibil-
ity of exhaustion attacks and derive adversarial strategies.
Moreover, we evaluate the feasibility of such attacks and
quantify their prospects and costs in Section IV. In Section V,
we discuss related work, before concluding the paper in
Section VI.
II. LIGHTNING NETWORK ANALYSIS
In the Lightning Network, every node has a global view
of the payment channel network (PCN) topology and is
responsible for finding routes on the basis of this data set,
i.e., conducting source routing. The routing information is
distributed by broadcasting channel_announcement and
channel_update messages via the Lightning Network’s
own peer-to-peer network. These messages contain relevant
channel information, such as signatures, channel capacities,
and fees. However, mainly due to privacy reasons, actual
channel balances are not included. As a consequence, it cannot
be predetermined whether sufficient funding is available to
route a payment. In case of a failed payment attempt, the client
needs to repeat the process until successfully completed.
The payment channel design of the Lightning Network
ensures balance security for multihop payments through the
use of hash time locked contracts (HTLCs). In this construc-
tion, the receiver of a payment first issues a payment request
containing a hash H(r) of a secret value r. The sender then
initiates the payment and sends a transaction to the first node
on the payment path that may only be redeemed by revealing
the pre-image r. This process is repeated for every hop on the
path, until a transaction reaches the receiver of the payment.
The receiver then redeems the payment by publishing r,
allowing all nodes on the path to claim their locked funds
as well. To enable atomicity, HTLCs allow to revert stuck
payment negotiations after the expiration of the transaction
time locks, which currently defaults to one hour [13].
We can see that HTLC processing requires all participants
to be online and respondent. Otherwise, if a node goes offline,
funds may be locked for an extended time period. In the worst
case, it is even possible that an adversary publishes outdated
states, effectively stealing coins. The robustness of the PCN
topology therefore is the baseline for the resilience of the
Lightning Network, e.g., to node failures due to DoS attacks.
In the following, we evaluate metrics like the betweenness
centrality, clustering coefficient, and degree distribution to
draw conclusions on whether the topology exhibits properties
similar to small-world or scale-free networks. These common
properties provide insights on the degree of centralization and
the sensitivity to random failures as well as targeted attacks.
A. Data Collection and Methodology
Over the span of two measurement periods (Oct.–Nov.
2018 and Jan.–Feb. 2019), we gathered information on the
Lightning Network’s topology. To this end, we used two
virtual machines based on Ubuntu Server 18.04, which run
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Fig. 1. Time series showing the Lightning Network’s number of nodes and
its total capacity (i.e., sum of all payment channel capacities).
bitcoind1 and lnd2, respectively. We utilized the RPC
describegraph to retrieve the topology and regularly store
snapshots in a .json file. For the data analysis we developed
a python evaluation script, using the networkx [16] and
powerlaw [17] libraries. Our code and all data sets are
available online3.
In general, a node’s view of the topology depends on
the information it gets from its neighbors. Moreover, not all
channels have to be announced publicly. Therefore, there is no
guarantee to have a complete view of the network. However,
we assume that the publicly available data characterizes the
network’s essential traits. While the network has immensely
grown in terms of the number of nodes as well as in total
capacity the past months (see Figure 1), we can observe that
the topology’s characteristics have not changed significantly.
The following analysis is based on a recent data set, which
was captured on Feb. 1, 2019 0:00AM.
B. Graph Measures and Metrics
We consider the Lightning Network’s PCN topology as a
graph G = (V,E), where V is the set of nodes and E the set
of edges, i.e., payment channels. The degree deg(v) of a vertex
v is defined as the number of its channels. A channel between
node vi and node vj is denoted as eij . A path between two
nodes consists of one or more channels. The distance between
two nodes is defined as the shortest path between these nodes.
The diameter is the longest distance between any two nodes in
the network. Similar to the diameter, the average path length
is defined as the average distance between any two nodes.
Betweenness is a metric for centrality [8]. The betweenness
of a node is the number of shortest paths between any
1Bitcoind, https://github.com/bitcoin/bitcoin, Accessed: 2018-10-24
2Lnd, https://github.com/lightningnetwork/lnd, Accessed: 2018-10-24
3https://gitlab.tu-berlin.de/rohrer/discharged-pc-data
TABLE I
COMPARISON OF GRAPH MEASURES FOR DIFFERENT GRAPH TYPES.
PCN Scale-free Random
Node count 2400 2400 2400
Edge count 13884 11975 13941
Diameter 6 5 6
Average distance 2.92 3.25 3.45
Central point dominance 0.16 0.09 0.005
two nodes in the network that pass through the node. The
betweenness centrality cB(v) of a node v is given by
cB(v) =
∑
s,t∈V
σ(s, t|v)
σ(st)
,
where σ(st) is the number of all shortest paths between s and
t, and σ(s, t|v) is the number of all shortest paths between s
and t that include v. To normalize the value such that cB ∈
[0, 1], cB is divided by the number of all pairs of nodes that
do not include v, that is, (n − 1)(n − 2)/2 for undirected
graphs with n being the total number of nodes. Accordingly,
it describes the share of shortest paths that pass this node. In
general, betweenness centrality is an indicator of how much
control a node has over the network.
A subgraph G′ = (V ′, E′) where V ′ ⊆ V and E′ ⊆ E
is called connected component if any node v′ ∈ V ′ can be
reached by any other node in V ′. A graph is biconnected
if it is still connected after removing any arbitrary node.
A biconnected component is a largest possible biconnected
subgraph. If a node is member of more than one biconnected
component, it is called an articulation point or cut vertex. As
the removal of nodes that have a high betweenness and/or are
articulation points may have an increased impact on network
connectivity, they are potential targets of directed attacks.
Graph metrics typically gain meaning only in comparison
to other graphs of the same size. In Table I we compare the
PCN graph to a random Erdo¨s-Renyi graph [18] and a scale-
free Barabasi-Albert graph [19]. Note that while the graphs
share similar parameters, the scale-free graph has less edges
due to the method of preferential attachment.
From the comparison, we can observe that currently all
three graph types share a diameter of 5–6 hops. At the same
time, though, the PCN graph has the lowest average distance,
which is a favorable property for users as it reduces the failure
probability and saves routing fees. In terms of centrality,
we compared the central point dominance, defined as the
maximum betweenness centrality of all nodes. We can see
that the PCN and the scale-free graph have a central point
dominance more than ten times as high as the random graph’s.
The result suggests that the Lightning Network relies on few
central nodes in order to process payments.
C. Small-World Networks
Small-world networks are characterized by nodes that tend
to cluster and have a high density of edges. More formally, the
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Fig. 2. Degree distribution of the Lightning Network. The log-log plot
additionally shows the fitted power-law distribution.
diameter grows logarithmically with the number of nodes. In
order to test the “small-world-ness” of the Lightning Network,
we use the method introduced in [11]. It is based on comparing
the clustering coefficient to a clustering coefficient of a random
graph with similar parameters, which serves as a reference.
While different definitions of the global clustering coeffi-
cient exist, we use the transitivity definition [9]. Accordingly,
the clustering coefficient C is defined as
C =
3 · number of triangles
number of paths of length 2
.
Note, a factor of 3 is used to compensate that each triangle
has three paths of length 2. Thus, C = 1 for cliques.
Now, let Lg and Lr denote the mean shortest path length
of the PCN graph G and a random Erdo¨s-Renyi graph R,
respectively. Likewise, let Cg and Cr describe the clustering
coefficient. In accordance with [11], we consider a network as
small-world if S ≫ 1, where
S =
γg
λg
with γg =
Cg
Cr
and λg =
Lg
Lr
.
Applying the described method to our empirical data yields
Cg = 0.085 and Lg = 2.92 for the PCN graph and Cr = 0.005
and Lr = 3.45 for the random graph. We can already see that
the Lightning Network is more clustered and yields on average
shorter distances. We can conclude that the Lightning Network
can be classified as a small-world network, as S = 19.439≫
1.
D. Scale-Free Networks
Scale-free networks are characterized by a few nodes having
a very high degree and many nodes having low degrees. More
specifically, the degree distribution is similar to a power law
distribution, where the fraction of nodes P (k) having a degree
k is described as P (k) ∼ k−α with α typically ranging
between 2 and 3 [12].
Scale-free networks emerge if a new node can choose its
neighbors freely and prefers well-connected nodes. In the
Lightning Network, we have a comparable situation. New
nodes have an incentive to preferably open channels to highly
connected nodes, hence reaching a larger share of the network
with fewer hops. In comparison to random graphs, scale-free
networks are generally robust to random failures, as the chance
of a critical amount of high-degree nodes failing concurrently
is very small. However, since a few nodes have high degrees,
scale-free networks are prone to targeted attacks.
In Figure 2, we show the degree distribution of the 100
nodes with highest degree in the Lightning Network: the initial
impression makes the hypothesis of a power-law distribution,
i.e., scale-free network, plausible. To examine whether the
Lightning Network is actually scale-free, we investigate the
degree distribution along the lines of [12]. The empirical data
are plotted in a log-log plot in Figure 2. On the x-axis we
show the node degree k and on the y-axis the probability for
a certain node degree P (k). For a power law distribution we
expect a negative linear trend, where the slope determines
the scaling factor α. However, this alone is not sufficient
to draw conclusions. To get sound results, we additionally
perform a power-law fit using a maximum likelihood estimator.
More specifically, we use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
distance [10] to determine the difference between the actual
data and a proposed power-law fit. By minimizing the KS
distance for x, we retrieve an xmin.
With α and xmin, we can derive a power-law distribution,
but to draw conclusions it requires a goodness-of-fit test. Based
on a number of synthetic data sets and respectively fitted
distribution parameters (derived from the regression model),
it generates a p-value, which we use to accept or reject the
hypothesis of a power-law distribution. The authors of [12]
suggest to use synthetic data sets with a high number of
samples (ideally 10, 000 samples) and to reject the scale-free
hypothesis if p ≤ 0.1.
Applying this method to the empirical PCN data yields an
α = 2.18 and an xmin = 16. For the goodness-of-fit test
we created 10, 000 data sets, that in sum yielded a p-value of
p = 0.3314, clearly substantiating the scale-free hypothesis.
In conclusion, the degree distribution of the Lightning
Network can be classified as power-law distributed, suggesting
a scale-free network structure overall. Therefore, the network
may benefit from the robustness property of scale-free net-
works against random failures.
E. Robustness Analysis
To draw conclusions about the robustness of the Lightning
Network, we again compare it to other graph types (Table II).
We randomly removed a certain amount of nodes to simulate
random failures. Each time, the simulation was run 100
times for the Lightning Network, a scale-free Barabasi-Albert
graph [19], and a random Erdo¨s-Renyi graph [18], respectively.
The random removal of nodes has nearly no impact on the
random graph and the scale-free graph but separates the PCN
graph. The isolated components mostly consist of one and
TABLE II
AVERAGE NUMBER OF CONNECTED COMPONENTS AFTER RANDOM
FAILURES FOR DIFFEREN GRAPH TYPES.
Failures PCN Scale-free Random
1 1.13 1.00 1.00
2 1.20 1.00 1.00
3 1.61 1.00 1.00
5 2.86 1.00 1.01
10 3.66 1.00 1.00
50 14.00 1.00 1.03
two nodes and therefore will barely affect routing efficiency.
Yet, the graph separates and a random failure is very likely to
separate at least one node from the network. In conclusion,
the impact of random failures on the routing efficiency is
very low. Nevertheless, the prospects of targeted attacks seems
promising. Based on this insight, we discuss several attack
vectors and their impact on the network in the following
sections.
III. ATTACKING THE LIGHTNING NETWORK
As we have seen in the previous section, the Lightning
Network is actually rather centralized and exhibits a heavily
skewed degree distribution. This raises the question how the
network topology copes with attacks that target specific points
of interest. In the following, we present specific attack vectors,
including channel exhaustion and node isolation attacks, and
discuss a number of feasible attack strategies. Moreover, we
introduce metrics that allow us to quantify the adversarial
advantage of each strategy.
A. Adversary Model
With its growing success, the Lightning Network becomes
an increasingly interesting target for different kinds of adver-
saries. We assume an active adversary that may participate
in the peer-to-peer network, or attack its topology from the
outside. At this point, we do not make any assumptions about
the adversary’s resources as this will be a parameter of our
evaluation. In general, we assume however that the adversary
is always eager to act as efficiently as possible, i.e., minimizing
resources to maximize its adversarial advantage.
The adversary’s motivation (or goal) may vary and therefore
determines the attack vectors and strategies. For example, an
adversary may be interested in eliminating single nodes, e.g.,
to impede or censor their participation in the network. She
could also be interested in disrupting the network as a whole
and aim for a partitioning attack that could impair the payment
processing or even inhibit it entirely. Lastly, the adversary may
be a “selfish” node in the Lightning Network, e.g., a payment
hub, and interested in increasing her fee gain by sabotaging
competing nodes and payment paths.
B. Attack Vectors
1) Denial of Service: We consider denial-of-service (DoS)
attacks as a general attack vector to disrupt a node’s connection
to the Lightning Network by using “external” means, i.e.,
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Fig. 3. Node Isolation: the adversary E establishes a sufficiently large payment channel to the target node A. It then exhausts all outgoing capacity of A
and closes her channel.
not directly speaking the Lightning protocol. DoS attacks are
typically mounted by flooding nodes with superfluous requests
to overload their system. We however also include a broader
range of DoS attack techniques, such as BGP hijacking to
make nodes unreachable.
In general, a DoS attack on specific nodes in the Lightning
Network allows an adversary to inhibit these nodes from
partaking in regular payment processing. This attack vector
usually requires a reasonably strong adversary controlling a
botnet or having access to the Internet backbone. In March
2018, the Lightning Network was reportedly hit by a DDoS
attack that took 20% of nodes offline [20]. This incident shows
that DoS is not a mere theoretical threat, but a feasible attack
vector that has to be taken into account.
2) Channel Exhaustion: Each payment channel in the
Lightning Network has a certain capacity and can therefore
only route payments up to this capacity. We argue that this
fact provides an attack vector: an attacker with sufficient
funds is able to exhaust, i.e., block, a payment channel by
routing a payment over the targeted channel in the respective
direction. The attacker may not be able to infer the current
channel balance as nodes only announce a channel’s initial
capacity. She therefore may need to route multiple payments
to eventually exhaust a channel. To this end, the attacker could
perform a binary search, starting with the maximum channel
capacity and trying to route this volume. In order to not waste
funds, the attacker is able to route funds back to herself, in
which case only marginal routing fees accrue.
Using this technique, an adversary is able to disturb the
payment flow in the network and manipulate it to its advan-
tage. In particular, this attack may be used to cut parts off the
network graph, leaving it in decomposed state.
3) Payment Griefing: The threat of channel exhaustion can
currently be elevated by combining it with an attack vector
called payment griefing [21, 22]: as there is currently no fee on
failed routing requests, the adversary may initiate an arbitrary
number of HTLC payments to a node under her control.
This node may then simply ignore incoming HTLC requests,
forcing the involved nodes to wait for the time locks to expire.
Upon expiry, the entire state is rolled back, circumventing fee
deduction. Therefore, payment griefing allows an adversary to
temporarily claim channel capacity free of charge.
Channel exhaustion in general and payment griefing in
particular can be amplified by choosing longer payments paths.
In this case, the adversary’s stake is able to exhaust/lock
funds along the path. With payment griefing, though, we can
eliminate specific edges and paths in the PCN topology.
4) Node Isolation: By deliberately exhausting all channels
of a node, we can isolate this node completely and effectively
hinder it from participating. As shown in Figure 3, a malicious
nodeE can zero all outbound channel balances of a target node
A. The attack requires E to first open a channel with a capacity
that is equal or greater than the total balance of A’s outbound
channels (cf. Figure 3b). Since the Lightning Network imple-
ments source routing, the attacker is able to determine routes
and exhaust each channel by issuing a number of payments
with respective payment volumes (cf. Figure 3c). Of course, to
improve efficiency, the attacker can also make use of payment
griefing. This attack vector can be considered a generalization
of the channel exhaustion, described previously.
Node isolation leaves the target node unable to route out-
bound payments. While the node can of course still receive
payment requests, it is unable to fulfill them because all of
its funds have been shifted to the adversary’s channel (cf.
Figure 3d). In this situation, both sides can decide to close
the channel, which would return the funds to the target node
on-chain. Note that this would additionally deter the target
node from using the funds for 1–2 block intervals, i.e., 10–20
minutes. The adversary however could also leave the channel
open and refuse to process payment requests at which point
the target node is forced to close the channel unilaterally. In
this case, the settlement transaction can only be redeemed after
the expiration a of the lock time, which adds a delay that is
typically larger than 1–2 block intervals.
This attack vector effectively incapacitates the node from
functioning as a payment hub, i.e., it eliminates the node
from the routable network graph. In order to recover from
this state, the target node needs to open at least one newly
funded channel. As its old funds can only be reused after
the closing channel was successful settled, it has to invest
additional funds to be able to start rebalancing its channels
and eventually regain its routing capabilities. Note that this
comes with an additional overhead for the target node, since
it has to pay fees for the funding transaction in the Bitcoin
network.
To conclude, even by design, it is possible to remove edges
and nodes from the routable Lightning Network. However,
depending on the utilized attack vector, the adversary may
have to provide more or less resources to carry out the attack.
C. Attack Strategies
Equipped with the means to remove edges and nodes, the
adversary may try to cause maximum damage along the lines
of the previously discussed adversary goals. Depending on
these goal, however, she may choose a different strategy, i.e.,
a different set of nodes and edges to attack. In the following
we discuss a number of attack strategies.
1) Highest Degree/Betweenness/Eigenvector Centrality
Nodes: An adversary aiming to damage the network as a
whole might try to destabilize or even partition the network
graph, effectively impeding oder hindering cross-network
payment routing. For this, the adversary might try to remove
the participants according to their importance in the network.
Promising strategies therefore prioritize central nodes with
respect to some kind of centrality metric. Therefore, as an
initial strategy, we propose that the attacker may target nodes
based on their degree in descending order.
Moreover, the attacker may target nodes based on the previ-
ously mentioned betweenness centrality [8] or their eigenvec-
tor centrality [23], which can consider not only the topological
location, but also the edge capacities of a node.
2) Highest Ranked Minimum Cut Sets: A minimum cut set
of a graph is a set of edges with minimal accumulated capacity
that, when removed, partitions the graph. Therefore, minimum
cuts are prime target when an adversary aims for network
partitioning. However, not all cuts are created equal: while
some may partition the network quite effectively, others may
only cut off a single node. Given that the adversary has only
limited resources at her disposal, it is important to prioritize
the targeted minimum cuts according their importance in real
world payment scenarios. Therefore, we propose to calculate
a high number of potential (s, t)-cuts for randomly picked
terminals s and t, and rank the individual cuts by the number
of their occurrences. By targeting the highest-ranked cuts,
the adversary focuses on the network bottlenecks hindering
payment processing first.
3) Highest Ranked Parallel Paths: An adversary that par-
ticipates in the network as a payment hub may be interested
in increasing her revenue by eliminating competitors. Of
course, the adversary may again target competing hubs by their
importance in the network, e.g., by node degree. However,
such a strategy would not consider how payments are routed
in the Lightning Network. Therefore, we propose to simulate
random payments and record the resulting payment paths.
Excluding the paths involving the adversary’s hub, nodes can
be ranked according to their involvement in the remaining
payment paths. Accordingly, the adversary eliminates nodes
that are part of many competing routes with the intention to
increase her fees by processing more payments.
D. Quantifying Adversarial Success
In the following, we propose a number of metrics that allow
us (and the adversary for that matter) to quantify the impact
of an attack strategy. To provide an overall metric, we define
the adversary’s advantage of an adversary, i.e., success of
the attack, as the relative decrease in the respective metric
concerning the a priori measurement m and the a posteriori
measurement m′:
∆m =
∣∣∣∣
m−m′
m
∣∣∣∣ =
∣∣∣∣1−
m′
m
∣∣∣∣ .
The higher ∆m becomes the higher the adversary’s success
according to metric m will be. It generally provides a way to
relatively compare the prospect of different attack strategies
from different perspectives.
An attacker may try to partition the network into a number
of subgraphs. While the impact of such an attack is limited
when the adversary is only excluding single nodes, it may
be much more severe if she can cut off larger segments of
the network. A sound measure for general network robustness
should capture the share of nodes that are disconnected from
the network graph. We therefore propose the number of reach-
able nodes r as a metric. Given all connected components
Ci, we define the largest connected component C1 to be the
Lightning Network. Accordingly, we can calculate r as the
network’s node cardinality r = |C1|. This metric can be used
to calculate the adversarial advantage ∆r as defined above.
However, as some nodes are more central and provide a
larger share of the network’s total capacity than others, the
impact of node isolation on the liquidity of the network may
vary heavily depending on the target. To quantify the impact,
we propose the average maximum flow as another metric: for
n rounds, we draw a pair of nodes si, ti ∈ V, i ∈ {1 . . . n}
by uniform random sampling and calculate the maximum
flow Fi(si, ti) along the lines of [24, 25]. The average maxi-
mum flow is then given by
F =
n∑
i=1
Fi(si, ti)
n
and can be used to calculate the adversarial advantage ∆F .
While the average maximum flow is a good indicator of
the routable capacity in the network, it does not necessarily
reflect the actual expected payment success, since currently
the Lightning Network only uses single-path routing to fulfill
payments. Therefore, we additionally introduce the expected
payment success ratio s as a metric for how likely payments
can be processed by the network. To get a sound estimation,
we simulate a high number of transactions between random
nodes and calculate the success ratio as
s =
#successful payments
#attempts
.
Accordingly, the adversarial advantage is given by ∆s. As the
validity of this measure heavily depends on the transaction
model, it will especially benefit from parametrization based
on empirical data.
In order to quantify the potential success of an internal ad-
versary aiming for increased revenue, we propose to simulate
a high number of payments and accumulate the fee gain gi,ht
for the adversary’s hub ha that accrues over all simulated
payments i ∈ {1 . . . n}. The average fee gain
gh =
n∑
i=1
gi,ha
n
may then be used to indicate the adversary’s success.
IV. EVALUATION
A. Proof of Concept
In order to validate the feasibility of our node isolation
attack, we built a simple toy scenario mimicking the attack
shown in Figure 3. We ran five independent lnd instances,
which were connected to the Bitcoin testnet. The target node A
established three channels with outbound capacities set to
75,000, 100,000, and 125,000 satoshis, respectively. The at-
tacker E established a channel with a total capacity of 400,000
satoshis to A, which is sufficient to exhaust A’s channels and
therefore hinder any other node from routing through A. In
our example, we repeatedly sent payments of declining size
until A was able to route no more than 100 satoshis (currently
≈ 0.0037 USD), at which point we considered the attack to
be successful.
B. Evaluation Model
The following evaluation of topology-based attacks on the
Lightning Network is based on simulations we implemented
using networkx [16]. As before, the snapshot from Feb. 1,
2019 is used as our reference dataset. While the dataset
provides real-world data on nodes, edges, and edge capacities,
it does not include the actual channel balances. We therefore
assumed the given capacities to be the balance both ways,
likely resulting in an overestimation of the routable funds, i.e.,
yielding a best-case estimation for the considered metrics.
The proposed metrics and attack strategies rely on the avail-
ability of a solid payment model that reflects how transactions
of a certain volume traverse the network. Due to the lack
of real-world transaction data of the Lightning Network we
draw source and target nodes uniformly at random from the
network nodes. By doing this, we refrain from introducing
unnecessary complex and artificial assumptions. We also as-
sume a single-path routing scheme as currently implemented
by the Lightning Network: each payment is processed by
first excluding all edges with insufficient capacities from the
routable network graph. On the remaining graph, shortest path
routing is performed.
As our data base for payment volumes, we collected real
world payment data from the Ripple network [26]. For this, we
retrieved all XRP transactions that occurred at our reference
date Feb. 1, 2019 and converted it to the respective values
in satoshis. The transaction volumes are chosen by uniform
random sampling from this data set.
All algorithms are repeated 1,000 times to ensure statistical
significance. Furthermore, to ensure the reproducibility of the
applied metrics, we opted to fixate the pseudorandom number
generator’s seed value for each round of simulation. Thereby,
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Fig. 4. Payment success ratio s before (horizontal line) and after the removal
of n nodes according to different attack strategies.
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Fig. 5. Required adversarial budget to remove n nodes by node isolation and
according to different attack strategies.
the same input data is utilized by all metrics, improving the
comparability between measurements.
C. Partitioning Attacks
As we have seen, a capable adversary may isolate single
nodes in the network. In the following, we analyze the Light-
ning Network’s resilience to an adversary aiming for maximal
damage to the network, i.e., network partitioning. To this end,
we assume that the attacker is capable of removing a certain
number of nodes from the routable network graph, e.g., by the
means of DoS attacks or node isolation attacks. We simulated
the previously introduced attack strategies and recorded the
network state before (a priori) and after (a posteriori) the
attack: removing nodes by decreasing degree, by decreasing
betweenness and eigenvector centrality, and by highest ranked
minimum cuts. Moreover, we evaluated uniform random node
removal as a baseline.
As an initial measure, Figure 4 shows the payment success
ratio s before (horizontal line) and after the respective attacks
happened. Notably, even before the attack only 675 out of the
1,000 tried payments succeeded. Moreover, we can see that
the strategies work out quite differently, with degree-based
removal and betweenness-based removal resulting in a steep
decrease of the success ratio (down to around 10% success),
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Fig. 6. Adversary’s advantage for success ratio, reachability, and average maximum flow after the removal of n nodes according to different attack strategies.
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Fig. 7. Attainable adversary’s advantage depending on her budget for node isolation attacks.
while the random and minimum cut strategies measure around
the baseline. Accordingly, the adversary’s advantage for the
success rate ∆s is the highest for the former strategies, as
shown in Figure 6. Similar results can be seen for the reach-
ability, where the degree and betweenness strategies achieve
∆r values of larger than 0.5, i.e., cutting off more than half
of the network.
Moreover, the average maximum flow of the network is
heavily impaired when removing central nodes. Here, the
eigenvector strategy is superior until it is outperformed by the
degree and betweenness strategies. The latter two eventually
lead to a near-total collapse of the maximum flow, i.e.,
∆F ≈ 1.0, rendering the remaining network useless.
So far, targeting nodes based on their centrality seems to be
the most promising strategy for an adversary that is capable of
eliminating a certain number of nodes. However, as we see in
Figure 5, the centrality-based strategies also require the largest
budget to successfully mount node isolation attacks, while the
minimum cut strategy exhibits really low budget requirements.
In the following, we therefore evaluate the efficiency of our
attack strategies.
D. Efficiency of Node Isolation Attacks
In order to evaluate the efficiency of the attack strategies,
we assigned each adversary a budget and then analyzed the
“damage” it can cause. In particular, we simulate a node
isolation only, if the attacker’s (remaining) budget is large
enough to remove all edges. Otherwise, the simulation skips
the node and tries to utilize the available funds on the next
target proposed by the respective strategy. Likewise, we only
remove complete cuts. As a consequence, the minimum cut
strategy does not always consume the full budget.
The results are shown in Figure 7: independently of the
strategy, we observe that it requires high budgets to give the
adversary the power to reliably disturb all payment attempts,
which would result in a high advantage score ∆s. Notably,
the previously underperforming minimum cuts and random
node removal strategies exhibit the best efficiency properties,
e.g., an adversary could attain an advantage of ∆s = 0.4
when spending around 200 BTC. Similar behaviour can be
seen for the impact on the adversary’s advantage in terms of
the reachability ∆r and average maximum flow ∆F . While
some strategies seem to be subject to fluctuations, which do
not always allow to infer a clear ordering in efficiency, the
highest ranked minimum cut strategy again clearly stands out
as the most efficient in terms of the ∆r and ∆F , exhibiting
values above 0.5 in both cases. This is not surprising, since
the maximum cut strategy targets the connecting edges and
nodes first, whose removal has a significant impact on graph
connectivity and the available network capacity.
E. Fee Gain
In contrast to disrupting the network, an adversary might
be interested in increasing its own profit by strategically
eliminating competing nodes. We assumed that this adversary
is an established payment hub in the network (amongst the top
10 nodes ranked by total capacity). According to our strategies,
most notable highest ranked degree and highest ranked parallel
paths, we eliminated up to 30 nodes. We used the average
fee gain as metric to quantify the adversary’s success. While
the adversary can indeed profit from eliminating nodes, we
cannot observe a clear trend. In fact, we believe that node-
based elimination strategies are too coarsely grained. Instead,
we argue that an channel-based elimination strategy might be
superior, which we intend to investigate in the future.
F. Discussion
In our analysis, we assume that each node functions as
a payment hub, i.e., accepts incoming payment channels.
Moreover, the attacker is assumed to find an adequate endpoint
with sufficient capacity to route payments. This is especially
important if the attacker does not execute payment griefing
attacks, but needs to route payments back to herself. In this
case, the attacker has to ensure that some nodes in the network
first establish channels of sufficient volume to her secondary
node, i.e., her target node is connected with high enough
inbound capacity.
In order to mitigate the possibility of node isolation attacks,
the client software should employ rate limiting techniques to
limit the number of incoming channels and incoming channel
volume. This would make it harder for an adversary to quickly
establish high-volume channels from an advantageous position
in the topology. However, a client probably cannot mitigate
the risk of node isolation attacks entirely, since the attacker
may circumvent simple rate limiting strategies by splitting the
funds over multiple identities and channels.
Moreover, network partitioning attacks may be counteracted
by the so-called autopilot algorithms responsible for auto-
mated payment channel creation. This may be achieved by
monitoring previously discussed metrics and restructuring the
topology accordingly to make it less susceptible to targeted
attacks.
V. RELATED WORK
Payment channels were introduced to scale cryptocurrencies
to high transactions rates. Several channel designs have been
proposed over the past years [2, 3, 4, 5, 6]. While some
designs are restricted to single-hop payments, others can also
be used for multi-hop payments and therefore are qualified
for PCNs. The Lightning Network for Bitcoin and the Raiden
Network for Ethereum emerged as the most prominent PCN
implementations. A technical overview focusing on Bitcoin’s
PCN design space is provided by [27].
Most of the research in the area focuses on challenges
concerning privacy, concurrency, and routing [28, 29, 30, 31,
32]. Concurrently to our work, the authors of [33] explore
the Lightning Network’s topology and also confirm that the
network exhibits properties similar to small-world and scale-
free networks. Security of PCNs was mainly discussed in the
context of dispute handling [34, 35], which assumes each party
to be responsive and synchronized with the blockchain at all
times. While this discussion relates to node failures as well,
security in general and topology-based attacks in particular
have been mostly neglected, though.
When it comes to the mainnets of major cryptocurrencies,
most notably Bitcoin and Ethereum, network and centrality
measurement studies [36, 37, 38] as well as security analysis
concerning node isolation [39] exist. Beyond cryptocurrencies,
many topology analyses have been conducted. For example,
the peer-to-peer network Gnutella has been classified as a
small-world network [40].
In general, our work is orthogonal to the previous work and
therefore contributes an important new perspective to the area
of PCNs.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we analyzed the Lightning Network’s payment
channel topology and investigated its resilience towards ran-
dom failures and targeted attacks. We’ve shown that the current
Lightning Network can be subjected to channel exhaustion
or node isolation attacks and that these attack vectors may
indeed have severe consequences for the payment success
ratio, reachability, and average payment flow of the network.
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